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27TH DISTRICT

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 10, 1978

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Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

I am enclosing an article from the London Daily Telegraph of March 27, 1978, authored by the highly respected British specialist on foreign affairs, Robert Moss. Mr. Moss's piece makes two salient points: (a) that the Soviet Union is constructing - or has constructed - a new submarine base in Cuba; (b) that there is "strong suspicion" that the Soviets have "smuggled" strategic offensive weapons back into Cuba.

I consider this an extremely urgent matter, and I ask your help and the help of your office in resolving it. Admiral Turner, does your Agency have knowledge of the construction of a new Soviet submarine base in Cuba? Does your Agency have knowledge of any attempt by the Soviet Union to install intermediate or long-range offensive weapons in Cuba?

I would like to hear from you on this matter as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Robert K. Dornan
Member of Congress

RKD/rd

Enclosure

The Daily Telegraph, Monday, March 27, 1978

RE/M
MAY 10 1978**RUSSIA TESTS CARTER****The Cuban missile crisis of 1978**

By ROBERT MOSS

THE Russians are building a pen for their nuclear submarines in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos. This, according to senior Western military observers, is the evidence of recent American aerial surveillance.

In a strong suspicion that Soviet strategic missiles have already been smuggled back to Cuba.

The Russians tried to build a submarine pen in Cienfuegos once before, in 1971. But they were not allowed to get away with it.

When the construction work was detected, President Nixon responded promptly and decisively. He sent an unequivocal message, transmitted to Castro via Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador (then and now) in Washington. The burden of the message was simple:

"Take that base out or else we take you out." At this time round, things are rather different. According to reliable sources in Washington, the Carter administration has so far made no attempt to warn off the Russians.

or has it done anything about alerting the American public to what could easily develop into the Cuban missile crisis of 1978?

Soviet bluff

be historic missile crisis of 1962, which brought Russia and America shuddering to the brink of war, was essentially a test of nerves. Khrushchev, who had not been overly impressed by the young John F. Kennedy, was initially convinced that the Americans would not call the Soviet bluff.

Similarly, the current Soviet leadership might have drawn the conclusion, after 18 months of confusion or inaction in American foreign policy, during which the Russians have been allowed to make notable strategic advances in Africa, that America's leader lacks the will to respond.

They are also well aware that they are in a much stronger strategic position than in 1962, and that Mr Carter would need even stronger nerves than President Kennedy to call their bluff.

An American failure to resist such gross provocation as a new Soviet bid to install nuclear missiles just off the coast of Florida, would amount to a damning admission of weakness.

Yet the gap between words and action is a gulf in which a man, even a man as powerful as the American President, can lose himself. The Russians will not judge Mr Carter by his words, but by his actions.

In the chancellories of the world (and "not least" in Peking) assessments of what the Carter administration really means will not be based on an occasional speech that may, well, be primarily directed at a section of domestic opinion but on how Mr Carter and his advisers cope, or fail to cope, with the realities of power.

Cautious leaders

The most brilliant strategist that I know, a man who has exercised a dominant influence over successive generations at the Pentagon since 1945, remarked to me recently that "the West should give thanks every day for the fact that the Soviet Union is led by a cautious gerontocracy, and not by a 55-year-old Marshal of the Red Army."

The Russians have, indeed, been cautious in testing the waters that have been left vacant by America's strategic retreat in the wake of Vietnam.

The best example is the fact that the Russians have not committed their own combat troops to fight in any of the major conflicts since 1945. This excludes Soviet pilots and military advisers.

But senior Nato officials are alarmed that Soviet confidence has vastly increased since Mr Carter took office—and also that Chinese confidence in the United States has correspondingly diminished.

They quote the brutal diplomatic pressure that was applied in Scandinavia last year, and led the Norwegians to "cancel military manoeuvres".

There is a fear, too, that Mr Carter's tough attack on Nato and the defence of Europe has merely served to divert attention from the unilateral concessions that America has made in the SALT talks and America's non-response to crises outside the Nato area itself.

There is talk now of a "global Brezhnev doctrine". The original Brezhnev doctrine, of course, was produced to justify Soviet actions like the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

It is not widely remembered now the Soviet Union is back-



that on October 5, 1962, the United States Congress passed a remarkable resolution on Cuba. It still stands in the American statute books as Public Law 87-733. The law states, *inter alia*, that "the United States is determined:

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supporting military capability endangering the security of the United States.

The role of the Cubans as Moscow's foreign legion in Africa and the Middle East—where some 40,000 Cuban military personnel are now stationed—is something of which the authors of the 1962 legislation could hardly have dreamed in their darkest nightmares.

Yet this clearly presents a threat of the kind described in clause (b) which, according to a law that has never been repealed, the United States is committed to resist.

The stationing of Soviet nuclear submarines in Cuba would pose a still more immediate threat to America's security.

Cold war speech
It is in this context that President Carter's "cold war" speech in North Carolina on March 17 must be considered.

Mr Carter's pledge that the United States will match Soviet military capabilities and will mobilise the forces to "counter any threats to our allies and vital interests" reassured many of America's friends who had been puzzled and disheartened by its failure to respond to Soviet aggression in Africa.

The tacit commentaries from the Moscow Press on Mr Carter's supposed "distortion" of Soviet intentions were also a significant tribute, although it must be borne in mind that the Russians test Jimmy Carter, the questions get the greatest answer. Let us hope to come up with the right answer to this one.

The American withdrawals from South Korea, raised Chinese fears that Mr Carter was shedding America's traditional defense responsibilities. Subsequent debates in Africa heightened the fear that the Americans will not stand up to the Russians.

The bond between China and the West is not one of traditional friendship or ideological compatibility or even shared economic interests. It is a cord of utility.

Cut the cord—in other words, show the Chinese that the West can no longer be counted on to contain Soviet military designs—and you may set in motion a process that could lead to the most terrifying conceivable development on the international scene: short of a world war: a non-aggression pact between Moscow and Peking.

The Chinese will be watching the development of the Cuban missile crisis of 1978 as keenly as anyone in the West. As the Russians test Jimmy Carter, the questions get the greatest answer. Let us hope to come up with the right answer to this one.

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